

## **Suicide - Bombing: A Unique Threat to Security Agencies in Pakistan**

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### **Abstract**

This paper deals with a unique threat posed by suicide bombing in law-enforcement context in Pakistan. The primary focus is on operational abilities of security forces as well as their limitations in face of suicide attacks. Attention is paid to justificatory techniques deployed by suicide bombers and their effectiveness in current sociopolitical and international context.

### **Keywords**

Suicide Bombing, Terrorism, Policing in Pakistan, Taliban Recruiting Strategies and Neutralization Techniques.

In order to understand predicament of Police vis-à-vis militants, we need to contextualize it within both domestic politics and international pressures from the very beginning. Domestically, Pakistan is mired in rampant corruption at the highest level. Political government and its bureaucratic cronies are brazenly involved in high level of corruption. Supreme Court is the only credible institution and that is openly flouted by both executive and legislative branches. The raison d'etre of Pakistani police since colonial days was based not on rule of law but basically securing the interest of ruling authorities. Police are divided into provincial and Police Services of Pakistan (PSP). PSPs are the upper caste of police, while provincial service generally constitutes rank and file. In the status conscious society of Pakistan any police officer from lower echelon going to higher position still carries stigma of "ranker" i.e. simultaneously part of and apart from the elite club. Now there are multiple ways of induction in provincial system bypassing seniority and merit contributing to deterioration of morale in rank and file. Even death of PSP officers in encounters with Pakistani Taliban (formal name of their organization is TTP: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) is glamorously memorialized and handsomely rewarded with money and commercial plots. The rank and file are like cannon fodder in war against terrorism just mentioned impersonally in statistical manner e.g. five or six constables perished in suicide bombing. An assembly line funeral is arranged, poorly compensated and the deceased family are quickly consigned to collective amnesia. Borrowing insights from Goffman's dramaturgical analysis the death of a PSP is front stage while mutilated bodies of average policemen are back stage. In Goffman's analysis audience see the front stage but front stage is made possible by people who are working behind the scene i.e. backstage (Goffman, 1959). Couple of years ago while I was travelling from Islamabad to Peshawar I saw

personally billboards memorializing influential PSP police officers. Hierarchies of death in today's live television will have some deleterious implication for the spirits of forces. Historically Pakistani Police were a feared but not revered institution but now it is neither feared nor revered. The Military on the one hand is overstretched between Eastern and Western borders and on the other involved in disappearance of citizens reminiscent of the Dirty War of Argentina (1976 until 1983) where thousands vanished in illegal military custody. Internationally US is asking Pakistan to do more in war against terrorism and her Drone attacks are very unpopular domestically. For Taliban militants Pakistan's role in US war against terrorism is like helping crusading armies against fellow Muslims. People of Pakistan generally do not consider War on Terrorism as their war and this is substantiated by surveys. In order to confer legitimacy on their acts, militants, terrorists and extremists are different labels manufactured by the epistemic regime of government for those defying authority of state. In reality militants are not monolithic groups, neither ideologically nor organizationally. Operationally, the militants who collaborate on the principle of my enemy's enemy is my friend are different franchises primarily united by hatred for pro-US policies of Pakistani government. All these factors and more have constrained operational abilities as well as morale of the police in this never ending violent saga. I believe it is not clear to many that what will be the ultimate end or direction of this melodramatic episode in Pakistan's history. This unending violence, unbridled corruption and grinding poverty have weakened the writ of state. Pakistan is awash with heavy weaponry; the recent Lyari debacle bespeaks the limitation of police against the heavily armed citizens. The role of the police should be understood and evaluated in backdrops of aforementioned factors.

Police are facing highly motivated enemy who is morally clear and determined to die while police are plagued by a mission that is not clear, morally they are ambivalent and psychologically they have mixed emotions. Theoretically speaking, police forces are expected to operate within the framework of individual human rights and the rule of law and that limit their abilities against an enemies who do not abide by such requirements and can easily move from one nation state to others (Naím, Jan. - Feb., 2003).

Classical insurgency movements followed tactics articulated by Mao: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue" (Mao, 1997, p. 242). There is a new saying in Taliban circles that US has the watch and we have time, indicating that Taliban can outlast US determination to win the war on terrorism. Insurgents' quantitative and qualitative weaknesses were countervailed by a protracted war of attrition. The element of surprise and subsequent extraction of fighter determined their operational tactics. Injection of Suicide Bombing (militants term Martyrdom

Operation) has changed the configuration of warfare and police activities. Except rhetoric of war on terrorism there is no clear vision how to fight this unpopular war. The police are not trained for such prolonged operation and that have led to further deterioration of law and order.

### **Lethality of Suicide Bombing**

Lt. Gen. John Vines while explaining the lethality of suicide bombing said, "foreign fighters (most of suicide bombers in Iraq) are what amounts to a terrorist cruise missile." For Taliban militant in practical term suicide bomber is a deliverer of payload to enemy target. "They can target a specific element without having to worry about their own survival. They are very hard to fight; so they take chances and do things someone who would worry about survival wouldn't do" (as cited in Miklaszewski, 6/21/2005).

Pape echoed Gen. Vines:

Suicide bombing is an effective weapon in an asymmetrical warfare. It is a weapon of the weak against the powerful enemy. In 1985, Daud, a leader of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, said: "We are prepared to sacrifice our lives - literally blow ourselves up in opposition to their tanks .... Since we cannot fight the enemy with weapons, we have to sacrifice our lives. And this is what is happening right now in South Lebanon." Sayeed Siyam, a Hamas leader in Gaza, said, "We in Hamas consider suicide bombing attacks inside the 1948 borders" - inside Israel- "to be the card that Palestinians can play to resist the occupation .... We do not own Apache helicopters ourselves, so we use our own methods. Given the methods used by the Israelis, we consider the door to hell is open. Their assassination policy and the bombardment-all this theater of war inside Palestinian villages and homes-we respond to that by seeking to make Israelis feel the same, insecure inside their homes." In 1995, the Secretary General of Islamic Jihad, Fathi al-Shaqaqi, said, "Martyrdom actions will escalate in the face of all pressures .... [they] are a realistic option in confronting the unequal balance of power. If we are unable to effect a balance of power now, we can achieve a balance of horror." In 1997, the Tamil Tigers' political spokesman, S. Thamilchelvan, gave an interview in which he explained that the group devised the use of suicide bombing as a means to compensate for the Tamils' numerical disadvantage-their population is about one-fourth that of the majority Sinhalese-and to more effectively attack the Sinhalese military and political leadership. The goal, Thamilchelvan said, was "to ensure maximum damage done with minimum loss of life" (as cited in Pape, 2005, pp. 32).

Dr. Ramadan Shalah, Secretary-General of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad summarized its utility as follows:

Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is trained to a very high standard... We have nothing with which to repel the killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives... human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs (as cited in Madsen, 2004, p. 2).

Effectiveness of suicide bombing can be seen in Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Israel is a mini-super power in Middle East and has almost brought all her neighbors to their knees but has remained helpless against suicide bombing. The same is true of United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. Israel has a high-tech military, police and small geography (which is easy to monitor) but still cannot stop suicide bombing. In order to deter suicide bombing Israelis quickly resorted to collective punishment (like Pakistani FCR) and so far it could not dissuade motivated bombers.

Pape (2005) sees suicide bombing as a strategy mediated by rational choice model. Using pleasure-pain calculus the bomber tries to inflict so much pain in the hope that in the end regime will be brought to its knees. Suicide bombers ruthless determination is obvious from the fact that they have attacked the most secure places as well as have killed and kidnapped relatives of powerful officials in broad daylight. Most of key government officials and anti-Taliban politicians use bullet proof vehicles for transportation. Suicide bombers know the futility of direct armed conflict with security apparatus and therefore do not intend to engage military or police. Their goal is that by blowing oneself in an unpredictable manner could definitely demoralize security machinery.

Pape (2005) summarized the effectiveness of suicide bombing in following words:

1. Suicide attacks are generally more destructive than other terrorist attacks. An attacker who is willing to die is much more likely to accomplish the mission and to cause maximum damage to the target.
2. Suicide attackers can conceal weapons on their own bodies and make last-minute adjustments more easily than ordinary terrorists.
3. They are also better able to infiltrate heavily guarded targets, because they do not need escape plans or rescue teams.
4. Suicide attacks are especially convincing in signaling the likelihood of more pain to come, because suicide itself is a costly signal, one that suggests that the attackers could not have been deterred by a threat of costly retaliation.

5. The more suicide terrorists justify their actions on the basis of religious or ideological motives that match the beliefs of a broader national community, the more the status of terrorist martyrs is elevated, and the more plausible it becomes that others will follow in their footsteps (Pape, 2005, p. 28).
6. Community support is essential to enable a suicide terrorist group to avoid detection, surveillance, and elimination by the security forces of the target society (Pape, 2005, p. 81).

Effectiveness of suicide terrorism is also succinctly described by Madsen in the following words:

An additional tactical advantage of martyrdom operations over conventional terrorist tactics is the guarantee that the attack will be carried out at the most appropriate time and place with regard to the terrorists' objectives. This ensures the maximum number of casualties, which most likely would not be achieved via other means such as the use of a remote controlled charge or timer bomb. Similarly, it is extremely difficult to counter suicide attacks once the terrorist is on way to the target. Even if the terrorist is apprehended, the explosive device can still be detonated (2004, p. 3).

I will mention three cases that would corroborate Pape and Madsen's opinions:

1. On 10 October, 2009, about 10 Taliban fighters in military uniform successfully attacked Pakistan Army's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, Punjab, Pakistan; GHQ is like Pentagon of Pakistan. This is a heavily guarded facilities and Taliban attack indicates that they had local sympathizers in Rawalpindi as well as help inside the GHQ.
2. On May 22, 2011 Taliban launched a spectacular attack on PNS (Pakistan Naval Station) Mehran in Karachi that lasted about 15 hours. Two maritime surveillance aircraft were destroyed and nobody arrested. Most of Taliban fighters died but some escaped or blended inside with servicemen.
3. What appears to be one of the most impressive jailbreaks in Pakistan's history was conducted on April 15, 2012 where Taliban freed death row inmate Adnan Rashid who was one of the masterminds of attack on former president Gen (r) Pervez Musharraf along with approximately 400 other inmates from Bannu Jail. These brazen attacks cannot happen without aforesaid factors.

It is self-evident that such attacks cannot occur without popularity. For logistics, public support is needed and for operational activities, tactical intelligence come from inside police and armed forces. . . Taliban or other militants have not only a popular base but they have also infiltrated government forces. Government of Pakistan appoints commissions to investigate causes of attacks and very few of them have seen daylight. It is common saying in Pakistan if you really want to do nothing then appoint commission.

## **Operational Difference Between Guerilla Warfare and Suicide Bombing**

In the classical hit and run type of guerilla warfare a major concern was extraction of fighters after an operation. Apprehension of combatants could cost an organization not only fighters but also of divulging valuable information. Therefore a lot of planning was done for post-operation scenarios. Suicide bombing has no such concerns because it is “one-way ticket” without any exit plan and fear of arrest. On the authority of Lord Chalfont it is said:

The whole time that I have been involved in terrorist operations, which now goes back to 30 years, my enemy has always been a man who is very worried about his own skin. You can no longer count on that, because the terrorist [today] is not just prepared to get killed, he wants to get killed. Therefore, the whole planning, tactical doctrine, [and] thinking [behind antiterrorism measures] is fundamentally undermined (as cited in Merari, 1998, p. 193)

Operationally speaking suicide attack has a great allure because terrorist organizations do not need to worry about taking out of comrades or escape routes. Rescue missions are complex and require significant resources. Arrest of a militant could be fatal to organization inner workings due to potential fruitful interrogations. In Madrid, when Spanish police surrounded terrorists the four terrorists preferred blowing themselves up to being arrested. In this way they foiled police attempt of interrogation. Similarly, Tamil Tigers fighters generally carried a cyanide pill for suicide if confronted with imminent capture (Madsen, 2004).

Sprinzak, (2000) came to the same conclusion about suicide terrorism:

It is a simple and low-cost operation (requiring no escape routes or complicated rescue operations); it guarantees mass casualties and extensive damage (since the suicide bomber can choose the exact time, location, and circumstances of the attack); there is no fear that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information (because their deaths are certain); and it has an immense impact on the public and the media (due to the overwhelming sense of helplessness (pp. 66-8).

Killing oneself in a premeditated and gruesome way conveys a message of a highly motivated fighter. “The element of suicide itself helps increase the credibility of future attacks, because it suggests that attackers cannot be deterred” (Pape, 2005, p. 28-29). This undeterred willingness to die for a higher cause has a demoralizing impact on those who are trying to stop them.

Berman and Laitin are of the opinion that suicide terrorism will be used against hard targets. By hard they imply one that is heavily fortified (n.d.). Hoffman and McCormick think in similar vein: “Suicide attacks offer the terrorist organization a precision-guided weapon that can pinpoint an otherwise invulnerable enemy (as

cited in Ayers, 2008, p. 861).” But the actual numbers and targets both hard and soft by suicide bombers contradict their assessment and loudly indicate that extremists have an unlimited supply of volunteers for all sorts of targets.

Many Western scholars have a very simplistic attitude bordering on naiveté in expounding suicide bombing. Most of these reductionist critiques look for motivation to conduct suicide bombing in eschatological universe and completely ignoring the socio-historical and psycho-political factors. Pape (2005) believes that suicide bombing follows a unique trajectory that cannot be psychologized to a criminal mind that generally engages in predatory activities for utilitarian reasons. Also, suicide bombers don't come from isolated and insulated cult-like communities that are detached from mainstream society. He says:

Rather, suicide terrorist organizations often command broad social support within the national communities from which they recruit, because they are seen as pursuing legitimate nationalist goals, especially liberation from foreign occupation (Pape, 2005, pp. 22).

Juergensmeyer, Cynthia Mahmood, and Jessica Stern “focus on the personal dimension of activism, specifically the experience of frustration and humiliation. They show how religion in such situations is important in linking a personal sense of fulfillment to the social and/or political goals of an activist group” (Juergensmeyer, 2005, p. 30). Popular egalitarian language of religion could be very appealing to socially excluded, economically marginalized and politically disempowered segments of a society.

### **Justificatory Mechanisms for Suicide Bombing**

Killing of innocent civilian in regular warfare is euphemistically portrayed as “collateral damage.” In other words killing of innocent non-combatant civilian is an unintended consequence of war against evil forces or unavoidable consequence of mechanized warfare. Extremist groups have appropriated the same language against state actors with great effectiveness to their targeted audience. Hafez highlighted this point in these words:

The ethical justification of violence can be achieved in several ways. Rebels could frame their actions as a necessary evil to end real or perceived social injustices; they could claim that they are resisting foreign aggression or alien domination; and they could argue that violence is justified to reverse a historic trend that is deleterious to the moral or physical health of their people . . . Antisystem frames that polarize social actors, heighten the threat posed by "oppressors," and portray the struggle as a total war against corrupt and irredeemable enemies . . . In the case of Muslim rebellions, insurgents and terrorists employed a master frame that spoke of a nefarious plot by Crusaders and Zionists and their subservient apostate agents to destroy Islam and subjugate Muslims in their lands (Hafez, 2005: pp. 159 and 191).

When rulers and the ruled live in different moral and economic universes then there is high likelihood of alienation from state and its institutions. Seeman believes:

*This variant of alienation can be conceived as the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes . . .* Likewise, this version of powerlessness does not take into account, as a definitional matter, the frustration an individual may feel as a consequence of the discrepancy between the control he may expect and the degree of control that he desires-that is, it takes no direct account of the value of control to the person (Seeman, 1959, p. 784) Italics in original.

Militants have successfully tapped into anti-US sentiments in Pakistan and their propaganda machine through CDs and DVDs successfully propagates their views. These audiovisual materials are openly available. Deaths of children and women in Drone attacks are used for both recruiting as well as justifying suicide attacks. I believe militants understand the immorality of civilian deaths in suicide bombing but like a torturer, suicide bombers rationalize their acts by various justificatory techniques. Sykes & Matza called this process “Techniques of Neutralization.” According to them:

The most important point is that deviation from certain norms may occur not because the norms are rejected but because other norms, held to be more pressing or involving a higher loyalty, are accorded precedence. Indeed, it is the fact that both sets of norms are believed in that gives meaning to our concepts of dilemma and role conflict (1957, p. 669).

In simple language, a militant believe I am not an horrible person but I am doing all these horrible things for a noble cause that is bigger than me and it transcends all generations. The noble cause could be fighting occupation, serving God's Will, protecting culture from alien influence, confronting Crusaders and their supporters and more, depending on the imagination of suicide bombers.

Police and security agencies are targeted for their role in war against terrorism as well as their brutal interrogation methods. Security agencies for their actions are dehumanized in the sense that humans cannot engage in such cruel methods. It is a well-known fact that the accused often gets killed while in an agency's custody. Supreme Court of Pakistan is playing active role in recovering the missing persons presumably taken into custody by security agencies. Sometimes, it is alleged that the security agencies in extra judicial killing beat their victims so barbarically that one cannot even recognize their faces. Victims' bodies are often dumped in deserted place and that spirals the anger and desire for revenge. How an agency supposed to uphold the rule law could engage in such activities? Fragmentation of job in an illegal activity performs self exonerative function. Bandura, Underwood & Fromson hypothesized,

that both dehumanization and diffused responsibility would reduce self-detering responses and enhance aggressiveness. Dehumanization was

expected to be a more powerful disinhibitor of aggression under diffused than under individualized conditions of responsibility (1975, p. 256).

Kelman nicely explained Diffusion of Responsibility:

The deterrent power of self-sanctions is weakened when the link between conduct and its consequences is obscured by diffusing responsibility for culpable behavior. This is achieved in several ways. Responsibility can be diffused by the division of labor. Most enterprises require the services of many people, each performing fragmentary jobs that seem harmless in themselves. The fractional contribution is easily isolated from the eventual function, especially when participants exercise little personal judgment in carrying out a subfunction that is related by remote, complex links to the end result. After activities become routinized into programmed subfunctions, attention shifts from the import of what one is doing to the details of one's fractional job (as cited in Bandura, 1990, pp. 10-11).

Hannah Arendt explained the same point in her Banality of Evil Thesis:

Banality of Evil believes that most of the murderous things in history are done by ordinary normal people in bureaucratically routinized manner. "Ordinary" bureaucratic men who lead compartmentalized lives- dutifully and even eagerly obeying orders to kill and torture people during the day while remaining good family men at night. This notion of a motiveless, thoughtless bureaucratic man was what she meant by the "banality of evil" (as cited in Miller, 1998, p. 58).

Herman describes this phenomenon in following words:

Doing terrible things in an organized and systematic way rests on 'normalization'. This is the process whereby ugly, degrading, murderous and unspeakable acts become routine and are accepted as 'the way things are done'...It is the function of the defense intellectuals and other experts and the mainstream media to normalize the unthinkable for the general public (1992, p. 67).

In preparing a suicide bomber there is an elaborate division of labor. According to Giddens, "the main substantive problem for Durkheim stems from "an apparent moral ambiguity concerning the relationship between the individual and society in the contemporary world" (Giddens, 1971, p. 73). Durkheim thought high division of labor in Organic Solidarity (i.e. urban communities) leads to weakness of both social cohesion and breakdown of moral fabric. Weak group solidarity will further contribute to anomic conditions. By anomie Durkheim means moral deregulation and disconnectedness from collective consciousness. A person who is not anchored on some moral foundation and has a delicate social bond is less likely to be concerned about the sufferings of others (Durkheim, 1997). Fragmentation of job not only reduces or minimizes personal responsibility of a trainer of suicide bomber but if suicide bomber is somehow arrested it will be difficult to tell the whole story to security agencies. Sprinzak elaborated this point:

A suicide terrorist is almost always the last link in a long organizational chain that involves numerous actors. Once the decision to launch a suicide attack has been made, its implementation requires at least six separate operations: target selection, intelligence gathering, recruitment, physical and "spiritual" training, preparation of explosives, and transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area. Such a mission often involves dozens of terrorists and accomplices who have no intention of committing suicide, but without whom no suicide operation could take place (2000, p. 69).

Suicide bomber is consummation of a process in which somebody indoctrinated him about the moral mission he is going to execute but bomber may not be fully aware that he is a cog in sophisticated terrorist machinery. Converting people to extremism could be relatively easily when system is illegitimate, corrupt, oppressive, plutocratic and where ordinary citizens are alienated from it. Alienation could generate helplessness, powerless and meaninglessness in one's life. Individual does not have a clear moral compass for navigating in this morally nihilistic predatory political system. Sociologically this social chaos could be termed as anomie. In an anomic condition public good is made subservient to private interests. In this morally disordered condition people live in "reciprocal distrust" (Seeman, 1959). Alienation here means a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. He has become, one might say, estranged from himself (Fromm in Seeman, 1959, p. 789).

The idea of meaninglessness . . . surely includes situations involving uncertainty resulting from obscurity of rules, the absence of clear criteria for resolving ambiguities, and the like. . . It may be further noted that the idea of rulelessness has often been used to refer to situations in which norms are unclear as well as to those in which norms lose their regulative force (Seeman, 1959, pp. 787-8).

When societal norms lose their regulative power then societies at collective level descend into famous Machiavellian "end justifies means" mode. Right and wrong are replaced by technical efficiency for reaching their desired monetary goals.

### **Cognitive Dissonance**

Festinger, (1957) did a pioneering research in area of Cognitive Dissonance. He believes that Cognitive Dissonance is induced by simultaneous presence of "non-fitting relations among cognitions."

By term *cognition*, here and . . . I mean any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one's behavior. Cognitive dissonance can be seen as an antecedent condition which leads to activity oriented toward dissonance reduction just as hunger leads activity oriented toward hunger reduction. (Festinger, 1957, p. 3)

Let us say a suicide bomber intends to kill one person but in result could kill many innocent people. This thought may cause anguish and if this dissonance in cognition is not overcome then it might be difficult to do the job. Kowol has indicated that

Dissonance is an aversive motivational state, therefore people naturally attempt to avoid dissonance-arousing situations. That is to say, persons prefer to be exposed to information that is supportive of their current beliefs rather than to non-supportive information, which presumably could arouse dissonance (n.d., pp. 4).

Festinger elucidates:

1. The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.
2. When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situation and information which would likely increase the dissonance (1957, p. 3)

Now the question is how dissonance is overcome? According to O'Keefe the most effective method of overcoming cognitive conflict is *selective exposure* hypothesis. If people generally seek out only media sources that confirm or reinforce their prior beliefs, then the powerful effects of the mass media are blunted (as cited in Kowol, n.d., pp. 4-5).

The Story of Sgt. Alvin York who was a pacifist turned into a fighter and recipient of Congressional Medal of Honor for valor in WWI is a living example of how a pacifist could be transmuted from non-violent person to a fierce combatant by cognitive restructuring. Kelman thinks,

The conversion of socialized people into dedicated combatants is achieved not by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives, or moral standards. Rather, it is accomplished by cognitively restructuring the moral value of killing, so that it can be done free from self-censuring restraints (as cited in Bandura, 1990, p. 3).

The Story of Sgt. Alvin York depicted in biographical movie 'Sergeant York' is a living example of cognitive restructuring. Skeyhill explains how a pacifist Alvin York could be converted to a ferocious Sergeant York by Moral Reconstruction:

Radical shifts in destructive behavior through moral justification are most strikingly revealed in military conduct. People who have been socialized to deplore killing as morally condemnable can be transformed rapidly into skilled combatants, who may feel little compunction and even a sense of pride in

taking human life. Moral reconstrual of killing is dramatically illustrated in the case of Sergeant York, one of the phenomenal fighters in the history of modern warfare (Skeyhill, cited as in Bandura, 1990, p. 3

All abovementioned factors have impact on police effectiveness. Police officers are not abstract disembodied entities; they come from same society and have same frustrations, grievances and are part of same moral universe. In this live television age it is almost inescapable for police rank and file not to be affected by social, economic and political crises. These factors affect morale and create ambivalence in police mission. Bain comprehensively defined Morale as:

Morale is feeling and action which maintain the same general quality and direction under the most adverse conditions. The measure of a man's morale is the sacrifice he will make to preserve his personal integrity which is a correlate of his group identification. Morale is self-respect derived from the respect one gets from others and gives to them; it is an aspect of a man's loyalty to the basic values of his culture; it is a sense of duty to preserve and promote values which transcend immediate personal pleasure, profit, and reputation (1943, p.419).

Suicide bombers are morally clear and highly motivated and therefore more dangerous. Importance of Morale was beautifully described by Colonel Foertsch: "The final word regarding victory and defeat rests not on arms and equipment, nor the way in which they are used, nor even on the principles of strategy and tactics, but on the morale of the troops" (as cite in Pope, 1941, p. 195). Based on multiple surveys Government of Pakistan and public have divergent views on war against terrorism. The Government of Pakistan thinks it is necessary but public has the opposite opinion. This could cause ambivalence and mixed emotions in police force and security agencies. Hartman & Zimberoff defines ambivalence as,

the strategy of preoccupation with both what is wanted and what is not . . . The ambivalent person realizes from this experience how debilitating their ambivalence has become and how it has literally drained their energy and kept them immobile in their lives (Hartman & Zimberoff, 2004, pp. 14 and 53).

Mixed emotions are accompanied by seemingly positive and negative effect simultaneously; in practical terms both sadness and happiness are experienced at the same time (Larsen, in press). Constables on a check post may be sympathetic to the cause of militants but may not agree with their tactics. Combined with ambivalence, mixed emotions and in constant state of hypervigilance (because in any vehicle or next person could be a suicide bomber) could take its toll in operational sense. Lower ranks of police come from mainstream society and their likings and dislikings are affected by public opinion and informal social control. They are caught between institutional demands on the one hand and social ostracization on

the other. One of the most unsung heroes are constables manning dangerous check posts in hypervigilant state for almost last ten years. One cannot sustain hypervigilance without creating psychosomatic disorders i.e., stressful mental condition can induce physical diseases e.g. high blood pressure, cardiovascular problems and more. Hypervigilance is

a mindset that overestimates the potential for danger at any given moment. It is accompanied by a state of physical reactivity as well as consequent fearful behaviors – all operating together to ward off the possibility of danger. While this unrelenting wheel of vigilance may feel like it will protect you from harm, it probably will not (Stone, 2011, p.1).

### **Is Suicide Bomber an Irrational Fighter?**

My opinion is that apparent irrationality is a tactical move and a strategic choice by rational considerations. Here geography among other things becomes an important factor. Geography has a tremendous influence; it has an influence for potentials for economic, social and political development; issues of boundaries; issues of transportation. We do not imply geographical determinism, but it does have a great influence on the historical development. Geography (Oldknow, 2000) does not necessarily determine morals, rather, it makes certain things possible. We do not think that geographical location makes people honest and dishonest. We think however, that when you are located between certain areas, certain aspects become potentials. In other word, if you live in Golden Triangle, in South-East Asia, where the border of Thailand, China, and Burma are near, where opium is grown; the fact that it is isolated, the fact that it is conducive to certain things help. When you look at Afghanistan/Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KPK) formerly known as North West Frontier Province of Pakistan (NWFP), which lies between the Indus Ganges region of Southeast, Iran to the West, and Central Asia to the North. That geography makes it a Corridor and a Barrier. If something is simultaneously both corridor and barrier, it has the potential to become the center of things going back and forth. A corridor is where something is promoted for transportation from one place to another and the area is also physically isolated and relatively inaccessible. You can look at Hindokush as a barrier. Also, deserts are traditionally barriers—now with air transportation it is different. Historically, the fact that Pashtun territory was so isolated that you could get off a major trade route and then just disappear. It is a rugged terrain and let us look at this way, if Afghanistan was totally flat like the Netherlands, we don't know whether they would have been able to withstand the Soviet invasion or resist present US occupation. The fact that there is an isolation that gives the local the ability to blend in and disappear, and it is also a place where you can move goods. You can move goods from the Central Asia to Pakistan, from China across Wakhan to Iran, all sorts of possibilities take place in

this area. It is simultaneously a corridor for movement of goods and barrier. It makes it easy to become a center of smuggling. Just look at Kazakhstan, which is so flat that there is no way to hide anywhere. Whereas, in KPK or more so in Afghanistan, isolated mountain valleys makes it ideal to hide. Therefore, it is absolutely wonderful place to organize resistance, to be able to fight great powers, and of course smuggle contrabands. It is not just ferocity of Taliban that makes their resistance viable rather it is facilitated by geography, smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, taxing poppy crops and working with local criminal gangs on utilitarian grounds. “Unlike organized crime, terrorists ultimately hold crime only as a means to an end, not the end itself” (Poveda, Jr., 2007, p. 36). As rationally irrational actors Taliban could cultivate relationship with criminal gangs if it is expedient. In order to sustain insurgency they have to coordinate with other groups operating in the area. Poveda, Jr. (2007) is right in his assessment that

Terrorists and criminals alike are most likely to cooperate in areas where the other has a comparative advantage. A marriage of convenience therefore ensues where agreements are not binding but rather momentary – be it a one-time event or lasting as long as both individuals who initiated the agreement honor their pact (p. 40).

In light of above discussion I will say that police is facing a herculean task and without some proactive solution it is a bottomless pit of law and order.

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