Current and Emerging Threat of Terrorism in South Asia

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Abstract

South Asia is the emerging epicentre of global terrorism, replacing the Middle East as the key breeding ground for terrorist operatives and supporters. Since the US-led intervention in Afghanistan nearly a decade ago, Al-Qaeda and its associated groups—notably the Taliban—have survived and revived. The Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), separating the rest of Pakistan from Afghanistan, has become the central theater of operations and unless governments sincerely and seriously work together and share expertise and resources, the spectre of terrorism is likely to grow in South Asia and could even spill over in the coming decade. After Afghanistan, Pakistan faces the biggest threat in the region. While tribal Pakistan faces the most severe and sustained challenges, the Pakistani mainland is also threatened. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban operating out of FATA have reached out, percolating their ideologies to other groups, including attacking Western targets in Mumbai in November 2008. While Asian threat groups are increasingly looking towards Pakistan, especially where Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are located. In addition to seeking the blessing of Al-Qaeda; their perceived vanguard, they also receive training and operational guidance there. Since 9/11, governments throughout South Asia have increased efforts to track, catch or kill active terrorists. However, they lack both knowledge and leadership to counter extremist ideologies. Governments must understand that a cleric that preaches moderate views is as important as a law enforcement or intelligence counter-terrorism officer in combating religious terrorism. Unless governments in Asia build platforms to counter ideological extremism — the precursor to terrorism — the region is likely to face a long-term threat. If the current pace of radicalization and operational action continues in the coming decade, we are likely to witness four trends.

- First, the spread and dominance of Al-Qaeda's global jihad ideology across Asia.
- Second, groups are likely to collaborate more by sharing expertise and resources.
- Third, the greater threat is not from operational contact but from ideological radicalisation, especially of Muslim communities throughout Asia.
- Fourth, more groups will conduct suicide attacks. And instead of conducting a large number of small scale attacks, these groups are likely to mount fewer medium to large scale attacks.

To reverse this course, governments throughout Asia should develop a multidimensional, multinational and multi jurisdiclitional approach. They should work together to build common databases, exchange personnel and conduct joint training and joint operations to defeat the common threat of terrorism.

Keywords

Terrorism, South Asia, Muslims
I would like to give this message to all oppressed Muslims living in all of South Asia, including Burma, Sri Lanka and India, that news of your condition makes our hearts bleed. But at the same time, our Jihad against America and its proxies for freeing you from the clutches of oppression gives some solace to our hearts.

Ustadh Ahmed Farooq, Al-Qaeda spokesperson in Pakistan, “On the Genocide of Muslim Minorities in South Asia: Rise from your slumber and shake the world!” al Sahab, September 30, 2012.¹

Introduction

The global threat landscape will continue to pose significant challenges. A range of national security threats - missile and fissile proliferation, organized crime, especially narcotics, maritime piracy, and, insurgency and terrorism - will confront the world. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs of Iran and North Korea, two defiant states, will challenge the West to act. Nonetheless, posing a very real threat to most governments and societies, existing and emerging insurgency and terrorist campaigns will dominate media headlines. Such conflict zones generate virulent ideologies, cause internal displacement and refugee flows, and contribute to terrorism.

All South Asian countries face threats from ideological extremism, terrorism and insurgency driven by left wing, ethno-political and politico-religious groups and movements. Traditionally, such ideologies and tactics have been confined to the Middle East, but with the proliferation of ideas, international media reporting, and frequent travel, these threats affected Asia. Although there are both secular and politico-religious threat groups, the most significant threat of political extremism and violence to the world including to South Asia stems from groups that seek to misinterpret and misrepresent Islam. Except for formidable left wing insurgencies in India and Bangladesh, support for Marxist, Leninist and Maoist insurgencies is on the decline. Nonetheless, the potential for violence in Nepal by left wing groups remain significant. The most active ethno-political insurgency is in Baluchistan, Pakistan. The multiple ethno-nationalist groups are coming under the greater influence of other Muslim groups. With the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), peace and prosperity returned to Sri Lanka.

In the foreseeable future, ideological extremism, terrorism and insurgency will remain the tier-one threat in Asia. Located on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, al Qaeda seeks to influence threat groups in Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia. While South Asia will appreciably suffer from terrorism, economic prosperity in Southeast and Northeast Asia will both pre-empt and counter the threat of ideological extremism and it's vicious by product terrorism.
The threat in South Asia is followed by Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. With the exception of threats from non-state armed groups to South Asia, rising Asia is one of the most stable and secure regions of the world.

**The Context**

Globally, the threat of ideological extremism, insurgency and terrorism will stem from four regions of concern. In order of threat, (1) Afghanistan-Pakistan, (2) the Levant-Arabian Peninsula, (3) the Horn of Africa, and (4) the Maghreb-Sahel. After the anti-Soviet multinational Afghan campaign (1979-1989), Asia hosts more radical and violent Muslim groups than the Middle East. Since the global epicentre of terrorism shifted from the Middle East to Asia in the 1980s, the Afghanistan-Pakistan region remains an unstable area. Despite US drone strikes and Pakistani military successes in tribal Pakistan, two dozen threat groups present an operational threat. Although the capability of Al-Qaeda has dramatically shrunk, Al-Qaeda inspired and instigated groups such as the Islamic Jihad Union and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia, Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Turkistani Islamic Party in China, pose an enduring threat. Other than mounting attacks in Afghanistan, these groups attack their own countries of origin and encourage, build capacity and assist like-minded groups to attack.

To mitigate threats and to immunize the vulnerable communities to ideological extremism governments should work in partnership with a range of actors. The mass media, along with educational institutions and religious organizations, should build enduring partnerships with governments and community organizations to engage the communities. Like developmental journalism of the 1980s, the media industry should take a hard look at how it can help create a more stable and a harmonious world. As media shapes public opinion, their reporting can either polarize or bring together diverse communities. More than ever before, the attitudes and opinions of both the societal elite and the ordinary masses are profoundly influenced by reporting in the mainstream and social media.

Policy and decision-makers worldwide are grappled with managing ethnic and religious tensions that breakout into conflicts. South Asia is no exception. Today, ethnic and religious violence constitute the predominant form of global conflict. About 70-80% of conflicts are driven by destructive ideologies that seek to divide and legitimize violence against ethnic and religious communities. Long after armed conflicts end, the virulent ideologies endure.

In countries where conflicts have ended, there is a persistent risk that the very same ideologies that seeded and drove the conflict will return with a vengeance. It is like a cancer. To prevent resurgence, governments and their partners must invest in reducing the potential for conflict. The strategy is to win the hearts and the minds of
the combatants and build bridges of friendship between the affected communities. Without reaching out to the combatants, the most affected of the community, the potential for conflict will loom. Media can play a role beyond just reporting sensational news to reconciling the hearts and minds of the affected.

**Trends and Patterns**

Contemporary Asia - Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia - faces threats from polarization of ethnic and religious communities. With the U.S.-led coalition intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001, Al Qaeda, Taliban and associated groups moved to tribal Pakistan. With the impending withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, the epicenter of international terrorism is likely to shift from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The stability of Pakistan and Afghanistan is likely to deteriorate. Although the Taliban itself is poised to return to Afghanistan, the international community is opposed to the re-establishment of the type of pre-2001 October regime. The global threat landscape is likely to change after the withdrawal of US led western forces from Afghanistan in 2014 and the likely return of the Taliban. With Pakistan, Iran, China, India and the US trying to influence future Afghanistan, the closest to what Afghanistan will look in 2014 will be like Syria today. The blowback will have security implications for the rest of South Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia.

In Central Asia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan faces threats from groups based on the Pakistan and Afghanistan border. Effective border control coupled with intelligence operations has reduced the threat of terrorism in Central Asia. With the exception of Xinjiang in China that borders Pakistan, Northeast Asia is the most secure sub-region from terrorism in Asia. Compared to South Asia, the sub-regions of Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia face a very low terrorist threat. Nonetheless, these regions of rapid economic growth are affected by both serious organized and low level crime. Increasingly, Asian transnational terrorists and criminal networks operate both in the cyber and the real worlds. The support networks in cyber space engaged in extremist propaganda and terrorist and insurgent fundraising are growing.

Traditionally, the Muslim threat groups in Asia were influenced by the threat groups in Afghanistan, most notably Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. For example, the Turkistan Islamic Party and its armed wing the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is operating in Xinjiang, Western China, threatening China. Similarly, most South, Central and other East Asian Muslims groups are instigated and inspired by terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In a scale of threat in Asia, the threat is highest in South Asia. While Afghanistan and tribal Pakistan faces insurgencies, mainland Pakistan suffers from extraordinary high levels of terrorism.
and other forms of political violence. The Pakistani military has cleared Swat and South Waziristan but al Qaeda and its associated groups, notably the Pakistani Taliban operating out of North Waziristan infiltrate and strike those cleared areas. India suffers from multiple insurgencies both in the north and the northeast.

Ten years after 9-11, a conglomerate of like-minded groups has surpassed the singular threat posed by Al Qaeda at 9-11. These were the groups that received weapons, finance, training, and ideology, mostly from Al Qaeda, Taliban and their entities in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda, created in 1988, maintained a steadfast presence in Afghanistan from the time the Soviets left Afghanistan in February 1989 until the time the US-led coalition intervened in Afghanistan in October 2001. This included threat groups from Asia – Central, South Asian, Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian groups. Like in other parts of the world, the Al Qaeda agenda found resonance among regional and local groups. Exposed to the ideology of global jihad, a few groups in East Asia are driven by Al Qaeda's ideology.

New Type of Threat

The threat that traditionally fought the U.S., its allies and its friends is reorienting to fight Asia. With the US led coalition withdrawal, the extremist, terrorist and insurgent threat to Central Asia, South Asia and East Asia is likely to grow. In the next two decades, India and China, the rising superpowers of the 21st century, is likely to face the same challenges the Soviets and Americans faced during the last three decades. The reorientation of the threat was most recently manifested when the Al Qaeda spokesperson in Pakistan Ustadh Ahmed Farooq said: 3 “I will like to give this message to the Buddhist populations of Assam, Burma and Sri Lanka that we have still not turned our guns against the followers of Buddhism. And I don't think you have the strength to bear even a few blows of Allah's Mujahid slaves. Therefore, by transgressing against our Muslim brothers don't push yourselves in a war which you lack the guts to fight till the end!"

Ustadh Ahmed Farooq added, “I would like to remind the Burmese government that your country has barely started to come out of international sanctions and you face a long journey ahead before your economy even begins to stand on its own feet. Therefore, don't act in a way that jeopardizes your peace, economy and national security. Don't think that the blood of Muslims will continue to flow like this and you will not face any hindrance in your journey to progress. I also warn the Indian government that after Kashmir, Gujrat and Ahmadabad, if you wish you may add to the long list of your evil deeds Assam as well, but don't forget that taking revenge for every single oppressed Muslim living under your subjugation is a trust on our shoulders. These arrogant actions of yours only provide impetus for us to hasten our advance towards Delhi. They only serve to assure the
millions of honourable Muslim youth living in India that succeed in this world and
hehereafter is impossible without adopting the path of Jihad and Fighting. I would
like to request the scholars and people of Bangladesh to step forward and help the
oppressed Muslims living in their neighborhood and increase pressure on their
heedless government to open its borders for Burmese Muslims and stop its
oppressive actions that only make life more difficult for the oppressed Muslims of
Burma and Assam.”

Ustadh Ahmed Farooq, concluded, “In the end I would like to give this
message to all oppressed Muslims living in all of South Asia, including Burma, Sri
Lanka and India, that news of your condition makes our hearts bleed. But at the same
time, our Jihad against America and its proxies for freeing you from the clutches of
oppression gives some solace to our hearts. Inshallah we will continue to fight with
patience and resolve against this global Crusader-Zionist-Polytheist alliance that
has oppressed the entire Ummah including you. We will continue to fight until this
Satanic alliance is destroyed, mankind is delivered from its evil and the reins of
power are snatched from the hands of stupid and corrupt people and given to the
believing slaves of Allah.”

In addition to continuous low intensity fighting, clashes and riots, the region is
likely to witness intermittent high profile attacks such as Mumbai 2008. Although
the November 26-28, 2008 attacks in Mumbai, was not by Al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-
Toiba (LeT) attack mirrored a classic Al Qaeda attack. The coordinated
simultaneous suicide attack was a wake-up call to India. Referred to as India's 9/11,
the 60 hour attack killed 166 people and injured over 300. In addition to Indians, the
choice of deliberate targeting included, Americans, Britons and Jews. The attack
demonstrated the influence of Al Qaeda on local groups such as LeT and the
reorientation of the threat to strike Indians. Pakistan faced many challenges of
dismantling LeT. Although LeT activities has been curbed, the political wing and an
Islamic charity, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), continues to operate in Pakistan. A
blueprint for other threat groups to follow, the attack demonstrated that small team
of highly motivated and well-trained “no surrender” terrorists could inflict massive
fatalities and casualties as well as economic and psychological damage. Like
Munich, a 23 hour drama, the media coverage of Mumbai, favored the terrorists. The
reporting was unrestrained. Despite significant investment to secure Indian
cities, Mumbai, New Delhi, and other urban centres face an enduring terrorist threat.

Power of the Media

Extremist, insurgent and terror as groups, from the Taliban to the LTTE, harness
both mainstream and social media to influence public domestic and international
opinion. To create an environment conducive for sustaining political violence
especially terrorism, threat groups invest in building and maintaining the media infrastructures both at home and overseas. The LTTE case study is instructive to understand how a government can win in the battlefield but lose internationally. Until the very end, the LTTE media galvanized supporters and sympathizers overseas to agitate generating support worldwide to preserve the LTTE. The key driver that generated support to motivate the LTTE rank and file was sustained propaganda, the charismatic leadership of Prabhakaran and the uncertain environment. Manipulative and deceptive, LTTE propagandists designed messages to influence both the attitudes and opinions of masses both at home and overseas. By operating directly as the LTTE and through its front, cover and sympathetic organizations, the LTTE was able to influence Tamils and the international community - their target audiences. The hallmark of LTTE barrage of propaganda is its aggressiveness – the message is consistent, repetitive and coming from different sources. The most commonly used messages are “genocide,” “human rights violations” and “war crimes,” the very same activities the LTTE engaged in during its life cycle. By expelling Muslims from the north and the east in the 1990s, tightly controlling the Tamil population in the 2000s, killing captives – Sri Lankan soldiers and civilians – and, entering government designated third No-Fire Zone (NFZ) and holding nearly 300,000 civilians hostage.

The LTTE communications strategy was three pronged. First, convince the Sri Lankan Tamil community at home and abroad that with their support the dream of Tamil Eelam would be a reality. Second, convince host countries with significant diaspora communities, foreign missions in Sri Lanka and advocacy NGOs at home and abroad that the Sri Lankan government was violating Tamil rights. Third, convince International Organization especially the UN directly and through advocacy NGOs and western politicians susceptible to electoral pressure to assist in LTTE's avowed goal of separation. Commencing with traditional media - underground publications and newspapers, clandestine telecasting and broadcasting in the 1970s and 1980s, the LTTE expanded into new media – websites, blogsites, forums, CD-ROMS, DVDs in the 1990s and 2000s. To recruit, network, coordinate and motivate, the LTTE also harnesses Facebook, twitter and You-tube and other forms of new media for social interaction. To build support for its lobbying and campaigning worldwide, the LTTE continues to exploit its own media capabilities. To overcome the challenges of penetrating mainstream media, the LTTE and its franchises has also enlisted human rights advocates, media and PR personalities, politicians, lawyers, academics, retired diplomats and other personalities that have name recognition. Through such access in London and New York, the LTTE was able to survive and revive after its defeat in May 2009. While the Sri Lankan government invested its time rehabilitating LTTE cadres, reconciling between communities and redeveloping the north and the east, the surviving LTTE
leaders overseas and its proxies in Sri Lanka want to see the international system punish the Sri Lankan political and military leaders that ended 30 years of political violence especially terrorism. Through the manipulation of a combination of information and the use of bloc votes and electoral pressure, LTTE overseas had cultivated a certain constituency. They sought revenge. Using black, grey and white propaganda and incessant lobbying, the second and third tier leaders were able to exercise significant pressure on the Sri Lankan state. In this endeavor, the LTTE remnants benefited from the resources, infrastructure and trained manpower carefully built overseas by the Veerakulasingham Manivannan alias Castro, the last Head of LTTE's International Secretariat (also known as the International Communication Office) located in the Wanni.\(^9\) Under Castro, the LTTE had invested building its global media capabilities to engage the Tamil population both at home and overseas as well as select human rights groups and key politicians in the West. Having engineered a humanitarian catastrophe in its terminal phase, the LTTE nearly succeeded in convincing the international community that Sri Lanka committed war crimes in the final phase of the war.\(^{10}\) The high point of the defeated LTTE was a Report of the UN Secretary-General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka dated March 31, 2011 citing LTTE content of 40,000 civilian deaths.

After its defeat at home, the LTTE has re-emerged globally. Although the core leadership of the LTTE has been neutralized and organization dismantled in Sri Lanka, the LTTE has evolved into a propaganda organization. As an ideological, informational, political and a diplomatic force, the LTTE has made a comeback. Within two years of its defeat, the new LTTE crafted an agenda that resonates with the West. Spearheaded by those who fled or lived overseas, the new leadership of the LTTE is factionalized. They chose a theme that was the religion of the west – human rights. Although terrorists are among the worst violators of human rights worldwide, the LTTE remnants emerged as the champions of human rights in Sri Lanka. An effective tool for campaigning and lobbying in the West, LTTE created new and strengthened existing affiliates to hurt and harm Sri Lanka. The new leadership of the LTTE re-crafted its messages to website content to meet the new socio-political reality. The very same group that supported, promoted, and glorified terror especially the use of suicide attacks enlisted help of public relations firms and high flying lawyers to prepare for a new type of warfare. To revive, the remnants of the LTTE identified vulnerable elite and institutions and started to work with them. The LTTE developed an agenda to exercise constituency and electoral pressure on Western politicians susceptible to diaspora and migrant votes and funds. Continuing to exploit the very same segments of the diaspora and migrants that once funded the insurgency including terrorism, the surviving LTTE leaders met with (1) governments, (2) political parties and (3) politicians as well as (4) international organizations and (5) human rights bodies. Using personal contacts, contributors to
post-War message impeding reconciliation at home and overseas. The LTTE's political parties and individual politicians, and constituents of politicians they were able to gain access. Appearing respectable and wearing three piece suites, they presented a distorted image of the reality in Sri Lanka. These LTTE fronted human rights bodies and campaigners avoided discussing the LTTE killings, maiming and injuries as well as LTTE's mass hostage taking in the NFZ. While Sri Lanka is continuing to make political and economic strides, the principal thrust of the second and third tier leadership of the LTTE that survived the fight continues to lobby and campaign against Sri Lanka.

As ironic as it may sound, the LTTE alleged that the Government of Sri Lanka committed war crimes in the final phase of the war. International organizations including the UN, advocacy NGOs including the human rights groups and some western governments relied on reporting by LTTE media organs that provided inflated figures of deaths and injuries. In the absence of a proper government media strategy, the LTTE media would influence some key western policy and decision makers. As the LTTE cannot operate effectively as LTTE in the West, the new LTTE operates through a set of innocuous sounding organizations that take the face of human rights, humanitarian, social, cultural, political, educational, and media organizations. Through such LTTE front, cover and sympathetic organizations, Father S.J. Emmanuel, V. Rudrakumaran and Nediywan continues to advance LTTE's defeated agenda. Adapt at harnessing both the traditional media and the new social media, their main target audience is the west. In parallel, to maintain interest in their homeland, the LTTE factions promote emotive icons, symbols and events among the Tamil diaspora and migrant communities. Away from the glare of the corridors of power in Washington D.C., New York, Geneva, Brussels and in London, they still promote Prabhakaran, the Tiger flag, Tamil Eelam, and “armed struggle” Armed struggle is an euphemism for violence including terrorism. Within a million diaspora and migrants of Sri Lankan origin, a minority segment keep the legacy of Prabhakaran alive, the Tiger flag flying, the dream of their homeland, and the future prospect of a resurgence of the fight. To maintain its presence and interests among the diaspora Tamils and other actors in the international system, the LTTE factions exploit the existing and built new media and information structures overseas. Today, the new LTTE seeks to influence the international community, international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and other players of significance. Adept and skillful at exploiting the global information and communication systems, the LTTE continues to politicize, radicalize and militarize another generation of Tamils both at home and overseas. As its access to mainstream international media remained limited, the LTTE would compensate by lobbying and campaigning human rights groups and like-minded bodies to make its point. Individually and institutionally, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and International
Crisis Group many have begun to question if they have become carriers of LTTE's.

With an increasing fatalities and injuries of Western forces in Afghanistan as well as a growing threat of terrorism to the US and to Europe, there will be an increase in Western public pressure on the US and its allies to withdraw from Afghanistan. Statements from political leaders including from Obama on timelines for withdrawal is likely to embolden the insurgent threat to Afghanistan and the terrorist threat to the world, including to Asia. At a more strategic level, Asian governments should continue to work closely with the West to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan. Without diverting the bulk of the resources to Afghanistan, it is essential to increase the capacity of the Pakistani government to respond to both the many economic and security challenges it faces. The threat of insurgency and terrorism in Asia can only be reduced by Asian governments working closely with the US and the European military, law enforcement and national security agencies.
End Notes


4Ibid

5Ibid

6The attack involved extensive planning. In addition to Ajmal Kasab, the only gunman of the attack team to be arrested, two Indian-born LeT operative Faheem Ansari and Sabauddin Ahmed were also arrested. While Ansari mounted reconnaissance of Mumbai targets, with safe houses in Nepal Ahmed smuggled the gunmen across the Pakistan-India's porous borders.


9ICPVTR Database, Global Pathfinder II, Translations of Castro diaries recovered from Viswamadu, 2008,

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Invited to testify before the 9-11 Commission on the structure of Al-Qaeda, Gunaratna led the specialist team that built the UN Database on Al-Qaeda, Taliban and their Entities. He conducted field research in conflict zones including in Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, Israel, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Somaliland, and Colombia.

Author of “Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror” (Columbia University Press), an international bestseller, Gunaratna is also the lead author of Jane's Counter Terrorism, a handbook for counter terrorism practitioners. With Michael Chandler, former Chairman of the UN Monitoring Group into the Mobility, Weapons and Finance, he wrote the Counterterrorism: Can We Meet the Threat of Global Violence? A litigation consultant to the U.S. Department of Justice, Gunaratna was United States expert in the Jose Padilla trial.