

**The Impact of Judicial Constraints on Government Powers as a Sub-Factor on the Rule of Law: A Study of the World Justice Project Index, 2023**

Eltayeib Hussein Mahmoud Sharaf Addin<sup>1</sup>  
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.62271/pjc.16.4.1127.1140>

**Abstract**

The study investigated the impact of judicial constraints on government powers (JCGP) as a sub-factor of constraints on government powers on the rule of Law (RL) of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2023, focusing on a sample of 142 countries. Using the regression model approach, we first assessed the impact of JCGP on RL based on the most recent cross-section data of 2023. The results indicated a significant positive effect of JCGP on the RL. Moreover, to capture the evolution of this relationship, the analysis was extended across the period from 2013 to 2023, revealing a strengthening impact over time. Additionally, we conducted a comparative analysis between developed and developing countries and the socio-economic conditions that shape the investigated effects differently. The results indicated that developed countries benefit from more robust institutional frameworks while developing countries face challenges that may limit the effectiveness of JCGP in enhancing RL. Policy implications emphasize the need for targeted strategies to strengthen judicial independence and government accountability. The novelty and originality of this study lie in exploring and improving literature concerning the impact of judicial constraints on government powers on the rule of law.

**Keywords:** Judicial, constraints, government, powers, rule, law, world justice project

**Introduction**

The rule of Law is recognized globally as essential in ensuring peace, justice, human rights, effective democracy, and sustainable development worldwide (PWJ, 2023). It does not have a specific definition, and its concept can differ between nations and legal traditions (Guernsey, n.d). Really, “it is a phrase much used and little explained.” (A Justice Report, 2023). However, the World Justice Project states that the rule of Law is a robust system of laws, institutions, norms, and community obligations that fetches accountability, just Law, open government, and accessible and impartial justice (PWJ, 2023). Similarly, the United Nations defines the rule of Law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that

---

<sup>1</sup> Department of Law, College of Business Administration, Northern Border University, Arar, Saudi Arabia. Email: [E.SharafAddin@nbu.edu.sa](mailto:E.SharafAddin@nbu.edu.sa), and [eltayeibhussein@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:eltayeibhussein@yahoo.co.uk)

• The authors extend their appreciation to the Deanship of Scientific Research at Northern Border University, Arar, KSA, for funding this research work through the project number "NBU-FFR-2024-2512-04"

are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.” (UN, 2004).

In addition to states, international organizations promoted indicators to measure the rule of Law, such as the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (PWJ, 2023) and United Nations indicators (UN, 2011). The present study explores the impact of judicial constraints on government powers (JCGP) as a sub-factor of constraints on government powers on the rule of Law (RL), espoused by the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2023. This indicator measures whether the judiciary has independence and can practically exercise adequate checks on and control of the government (PWJ, 2023). The analysis highlights to what extent the judiciary in the sample of states exercises independent power over the executive, legislature, and all government bodies and effective practical oversight since a vital requirement of the rule of Law is the existence of an independent judiciary, which, can decide disputes and guarantee respect for the laws (Hans & Janse, 2012).

According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNCP, n.d), “Independence of the Judiciary means that every judge can independently make decisions to resolve a case brought before his/her court fairly and impartially, free of any undue interference from any external party, including from other judges, regardless of their authority, whether institutions or persons. It also means that the financial and administrative independence of the whole judicial body must be protected and promoted by an independent Judicial Supreme Council, without interference from any other person or institution”. Similarly, it stated that judiciary independence requires the existence of judges who are not juggled for political gain, are unbiased towards parties of a dispute, and who compose the judiciary, which has the authority as an organization to regulate the legality of government behavior, validate neutral justice, and determine substantial constitutional and legal values (ZAJC, 2014). Additionally, the various courts adjudicate disputes concerning judicial independence without respect to individuals' political power, social position, or economic resources (Rosenbluth & Helmke, 2009).

The independence of the judiciary is formulated on the principle of separation of powers, in which the government is split into three branches: judicial, legislative, and executive. Each branch should exercise exclusive and recognizable functions appropriate to that branch and constrain its personnel to that branch (Thabo & Odeku, 2021).

The independence of judges is one of the foundations of democracy. It contributes to encouraging checks and balances among the existing branches of government, promotes economic and political freedom by constraining all bodies, including the government, from taking personal possessions and, by constitutional review, and combating the government's and parliament's attempts to repress the

opposition (ZAJC, 2014). Furthermore, implementing judicial independence reduces the risks of the dispute and avoids human despair arising from civil war or dictatorial oppression. Individuals and minorities are free from bullying by changing majorities. Impartial enforcement of contracts encourages private economic investment, reduces the cost of government debt, and inspires economic growth (Rosenbluth & Helmke, 2009).

International conventions have been stipulated for the significance of judicial independence and national constitutions and laws. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal." (UDHR, 1948). In the same way, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that "everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law." (ICCPR, 1966). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime considers judicial independence a prerequisite for the rule of Law and a vital guarantee of a fair trial (UNODC, 2018).

On the other hand, the judiciary effectively checks and controls the branches of government while applying and interpreting the laws made by the legislature. These checks permit political institutions to limit each other's power, such as blocking, postponing, and criticizing decisions, which limits the power of the majority to act regardless of the views or interests of others and confirms that policy is tested and behavior overseen (Russell et al., 2023). The judiciary, represented by courts, has the power to control the legislature and the executive by reviewing laws and decisions, examining the legality of these actions, and declaring them illegal and unconstitutional, according to the constitution's provisions or any enforceable law (RABIE, 1995; Mollah, 2022), which shows that the government is subject to legal constraints and guarantee liability, responsiveness, and openness among institutions (Botero & Ponce, 2011; O'Regan, 2005).

The present study aims to contribute to the literature on some issues. Firstly, it investigates how much JCGP can impact the RL and determines whether this impact is time-dependent across developed and developing states. Specifically, the study examines three key aspects: (i) the static relationship between JCGP and the RL using the most recent data for 2023, (ii) the time-varying dynamics of this relationship by estimating the model for multiple years (2013–2023), and (iii) a comparative analysis between developed and developing countries to highlight variations in the JCGP-RL relationship across different institutional contexts. These three empirical steps offer a comprehensive understanding of the evolution and heterogeneity in the impact of JCGP on RL.

This paper's reminder is organized as follows: The second section presents the method regarding the data and methodology. The third section is reserved for the results and discussion. Finally, section four concludes the paper and provides policy implications for the different results.

## Methodology

### Data description

This study employs the data, which consists of two variables, namely the “Constraints on Government Powers by the judiciary” (JCGP), as the independent variable. The second represents the dependent variable, “the rule of Law” (RL). The data is collected for 142 countries, 34 developed and 108 developing. The data is sourced from the “WJP Rule of Law Index 2023”. This document contains many sub-factors that can measure the JCGP variable from 2013 to 2023. I focused on the sub-factor “Government powers are effectively limited by the judiciary” as the essential part of JCGP, which can provide an evaluation of the judiciary's independence and practical ability to oversee and limit governmental actions. The variable is measured on a scale from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more vigorous judicial checks on government power.


**Table 1:** Descriptive statistics of the variables of the study (year 2023)

Variable	Mean	Median	Maximum	Minimum	Std. Dev.
RL	0.55	0.52	0.90	0.31	0.15
JCGP	0.58	0.58	0.91	0.07	0.16

The rule of Law index score, the dependent variable, also ranges from 0 to 1. This composite measure reflects a country's performance across multiple dimensions of the rule of Law, including access to justice, accountability, and transparency.

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the two variables used in this study for 2023. The results reveal a mean value of RL equal to 0.55, indicating a moderate level of RL for the sample of countries considered. Moreover, the median value is about 0.52, meaning that half of the countries have an RL level below 0.52, and the others have a level above this value. The RL values range from a minimum of 0.31 to a maximum of 0.90, with a standard deviation of 0.15, reflecting moderate variability in the rule of Law performance across countries.

Similar results are found for the JCGP variables, which have mean and median values of 0.58 and a median, indicating that the statistical distribution of this variable is symmetric (JCGP values are distributed around the central value). On the other hand, we note that the JCGP values are highly dispersed, as indicated by the significant difference between minimum (0.07) and maximum (0.91) values. In addition, results reveal a similar standard deviation of the JCGP (0.16) compared to the RL variable.



**Figure 1:** Evolution of RL and JCGP between 2013 and 2023

To visualize the evolution of the averaged values of RL and JCGP over time, we plot in Figure 1 the mean values of the two variables during the considered period. The plot generally shows a decrease in the two variables over time, especially after 2016, reaching the lowest mean values in 2023, reflecting a weakening in both the Rule of Law and the effectiveness of judiciary oversight across countries. Also, the JCGP was higher than RL over the study period, with a parallel decline, which justifies the need to investigate the potential relationship between these two indicators. The decline in these two indicators may be due to political instability, international economic crises, geopolitical events, and recent global crises like the COVID-19 pandemic.

The methodology employed in this study is based on a regression model. This approach can assess whether greater judicial oversight of government actions enhances adherence to the rule of Law across countries in time and with varying levels of development. Formally, this model is specified as follows:

$$RL_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot JCGP_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$


Where  $RL_i$  denotes the rule of Law index score for country  $i$ .  $JCGP_i$  is the score for the sub-factor “Government powers are effectively limited by the judiciary” for country  $i$ .  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_1$  are the model's parameters. Specifically,  $\beta_1$  measures the effect of the JCGP on the RL.  $\epsilon_i$  is the model's error or residual term, which contains the other factors affecting the rule of Law.

To estimate the model (1), the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique is used. This method allows us to determine the linear relationship between JCGP and RL, quantifying how much more substantial judicial constraints influence the rule of Law outcomes.

## Results and Discussion

### Regression results

Before proceeding with the regression analysis, we should graphically visualize the relationship between RL and JCGP. To do so, we realized the scatter plot between these two variables. The plot in Figure 2 shows that the points generally align along an upward linear trend, suggesting a linear relationship between the rule of Law and the constraints on government powers. More precisely, the plot shows a positive relationship, meaning an increase in the JCGP score leads to an RL improvement. This result suggests that countries with more effective judicial constraints on government actions tend to exhibit better rule-of-law performance. This result is consistent with a previous study by Lautenbach (2013), who states that the independence of the judiciary is essential to the rule of Law, as observed in how it endorses respect for the law. Additionally, it aligns with the independence of judges, which is an assurance of the democratic system (GUERRA, 2000). On the other hand, judicial control contributes to institutional building practices and may affect policymaking (Spanou, 2020).



**Figure 2.** Scatter plot between JCGP and RL (year 2023)

**Table 2:** Estimation results of the regression model (1) for data in the year 2023

	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
$\beta_0$	0.1365	0.0282	4.8456	0.0000
$\beta_1$	0.7203	0.0471	15.2806	0.0000
R-squared	0.625166			
F-statistic	233.4988			
Prob	0.0000			

After verifying the possibility of a linear relationship graphically, we proceed in this step to estimate the regression model via the OLS method to verify rigorously if constraints can significantly impact rules of law on government powers. The

estimation results of the model based on the most recent data of the year 2023 are provided in Table 2. The results indicate that the effect of the JCGP is positively estimated with a value of 0.7203. This result suggests that higher constraints on government powers, measured through judicial oversight, improve the rule of Law score, reinforcing that institutional solid checks contribute to better governance. This result aligns with Street (2013), who states that judicial review is pivotal in confirming that the executive acts are only in line with the law. Additionally, according to UniDem (1994), the court's jurisdiction exists in power to guarantee the respect of the constitution by the control of legislation and other acts arising from the practicing of public functions, the resolving of conflicts between the central bodies of the State or between different levels of States powers.

Moreover, the t-statistic (15.2806) is greater than the critical value of 1.96, with a null probability (below the typical 0.05 threshold), indicating that the effect of JCGP on the RL is significant at a 1% level. In addition, the global significance test of the model has an F-statistic equal to 233.4988 with a null p-value, indicating that the relationship between the two considered variables is globally significant. The model's R-squared value is 0.6252, indicating that approximately 62.5% of the variation in RL can be explained by JCGP.

### 3.2. Time-varying impact of JCGP on RL


To provide more insights into the evolution of JCGP's impact on RL, we estimated the model (1) in different years from 2013 to 2023. Table 3 provides the results of the model's estimation every year.

**Table 3:** Estimation results of the coefficient ( $\beta_1$ ) for data from 2013 to 2023.

Year	Parameters estimation			Model diagnostic		
	Coef ( $\beta_1$ )	T-stat	T-prob	R-Squared	F-stat	F-prob
2013	0.5900	5.8088	0.0000	0.5544	118.1746	0.0000
2014	0.6115	5.3128	0.0000	0.5539	120.4378	0.0000
2015	0.6101	5.3990	0.0000	0.5265	111.1852	0.0000
2016	0.6304	5.2363	0.0000	0.5222	121.3164	0.0000
2017	0.6358	5.5324	0.0000	0.5551	138.4686	0.0000
2018	0.6358	5.5324	0.0000	0.5551	138.4686	0.0000
2019	0.6577	5.3211	0.0000	0.5612	158.5886	0.0000
2020	0.6539	5.4797	0.0000	0.5533	156.0679	0.0000
2021	0.7144	4.6330	0.0000	0.6015	206.8289	0.0000
2022	0.7264	4.5586	0.0000	0.6179	223.1963	0.0000
2023	0.7203	4.8456	0.0000	0.6252	233.4988	0.0000

The results from Table 3 show that over the considered period, the year-varying estimated impact of JCGP on the RL is significantly positive, as indicated by all T-statistics higher than critical values and correspondent null probabilities throughout the entire period. This result implies that judicial independence and the practical exercise of adequate checks on and control of government significantly

improves the rule of Law. Along the same line, Malik (2023) stated that judicial review protects the rule of Law and the people, confirming that the government and its organs work within the limits of the law and are responsible when they contravene their jurisdiction or the practice of their power. Moreover, we remark that coefficient variations reveal key patterns that enhance our understanding of the dynamic relationship between constraints on government powers by the judiciary and the rule of Law.



**Figure 3:** Evolution of the impact of JCGP on RL between 2013 and 2023

Figure 3 displays the estimated yearly coefficients from 2013 to 2017. We observe that the estimated coefficients remain relatively stable between 2013 and 2017, and their values range from 0.5900 to 0.6358, indicating that judicial independence and practical exercise of adequate checks on and oversight of government consistently improves the rule of Law. This stability reflects a period when institutional checks had a steady and meaningful influence on legal systems. During this period, the R-squared values are also stable and show that the explanatory power of JCGP on the RL ranges between 52.22% and 55.51%.

The results show a noticeable shift occurring from 2018. The estimated parameter of the impact of JCGP on the RL slightly increased to attain a value of 0.6577 in 2019, peaking at 0.7144 in 2021 and reaching a high of 0.7264 in 2022. This upward trend in the coefficient suggests that the influence of judicial independence and the practical exercise of adequate checks on and control of the government on the rule of Law has intensified over these years. This could reflect evolving governance frameworks or reforms to strengthen accountability and legal integrity. Additionally, the R-squared values increased steadily from 0.5612 in 2019 to 0.6252 in 2023, indicating that the ability of the model to explain variations in RL improved over time, likely due to growing institutional effectiveness or societal awareness of governance issues.


The above results show that the impact of JCGP on the rule of Law has been steadily improving over the last ten years. The results highlight how judicial independence and the practical exercise of adequate checks on and control of government are used to maintain legal integrity, and this impact has grown stronger



in recent years. Similarly, UNDP 2024 stated, "By Upholding Integrity, the Judiciary Maintains Public Trust and Confidence in the Legal System, Reinforcing That no One is Above the Law." Policymakers may find this process helpful as it implies that consistent attempts to achieve judicial independence, checks on, and control of government strengthen the rule of Law. The data also supports that improving governance frameworks through reforms is crucial to attaining long-term institutional efficacy and legal stability.

### Comparative analysis between developed and developing countries

In this subsection, we proceed with further analysis of the impact of JCGP on the RL by comparing developed and developing countries. This analysis is motivated by the differences in governance structures, institutional maturity, legal frameworks, and socio-economic conditions characterizing these two groups of countries. Developed countries, with more established legal systems and higher institutional transparency, may show a different strength in the JCGP-RL relationship compared to developing countries, where governance challenges, political instability, or weaker institutions may limit the effectiveness of constraints on government powers. This analysis aids policymakers in identifying context-specific strategies and reforms to enhance the Rule of Law.



**Figure 4:** Scatter plots between JCGP and RL for developed and developing countries

To realize this analysis, we divided our sample into developed and developing countries, counting 34 and 108, respectively. Starting by presenting the scatter plots of each country's group (Figure 4), we observe a tighter clustering along a positive linear trend, suggesting a stronger and more consistent relationship between JCGP and RL. In contrast, the plot for developing countries (right) shows a more dispersed pattern, indicating more significant variability in the JCGP-RL relationship. This result may suggest that developing countries resist the rule of Law (Weingast, 2008). Then, these visual plots reinforce the idea that the impact of JCGP on RL may change whether the country is developed or developing.

**Table 4:** Estimation results of the regression model (1) for developed and developing countries

	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.	
Developed countries					
$\beta_0$	0.3995	0.0529	7.5475	0.0000	R-squared = 0.5924
$\beta_1$	0.4800	0.0704	6.8206	0.0000	F-statistic = 46.521
Developing countries					
$\beta_0$	0.2498	0.0287	8.6968	0.0000	R-squared = 0.405595
$\beta_1$	0.4528	0.0532	8.5047	0.0000	F-statistic = 72.32966

Table 4 presents the estimation results of the model for groups in both developed and developing countries. The estimation results for developed countries show that the coefficient of JCGP ( $\beta_1 = 0.4800$ ) is positive and statistically significant (prob < 0.01), indicating that greater constraints on government powers by the judiciary are strongly associated with improvements in the rule of Law. This result is consistent with the fact that the rule of Law depends on an independent, unbiased, and effective judiciary (Act 4 Rule Law, n.d). The relatively high R-squared value (0.5925) suggests that the model explains a substantial portion of the variability in the rule of Law for developed countries. This result aligns with expectations, as these countries typically have well-established legal frameworks and transparent institutions that effectively translate government accountability into better rule-of-law outcomes. The F-statistic (46.52) further confirms the model's overall significance.

In contrast, the results for developing countries also indicate a positive and significant relationship between JCGP and the rule of Law ( $\beta_1 = 0.4528$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). However, the R-squared value (0.4056) is lower, suggesting that the model explains less variation in the rule of Law than developed countries. This implies that while constraints on government powers by the judiciary are essential, other unaccounted factors, such as political instability, weaker institutions, or socioeconomic conditions, may play a more prominent role in shaping the rule of Law in developing countries. The higher F-statistic (72.33) indicates the model's robustness, though the JCGP effect in these countries appears somewhat less consistent and more influenced by contextual challenges.

## Conclusion

This study analyzed the impact of constraints on government powers by the judiciary on the rule of Law. The analysis is made in three levels. Firstly, based on recent data from 2023, which considered 142 countries, results show a significant positive impact of JCGP on RL, demonstrating that strengthening government accountability can enhance legal outcomes. Second, through time-varying analysis from 2013 to 2023, we observe that the impact of JCGP on RL has strengthened

over time, indicating an evolving dynamic where reforms and institutional changes play a critical role. Third, by conducting a comparative analysis between developed and developing countries, the results reveal key differences: while developed countries benefit from mature institutions that amplify the positive impact of JCGP on RL, developing countries show a more limited but still significant effect, likely constrained by governance challenges, political instability, and weaker institutions.

The results of this study offer important policy implications for enhancing the Rule of Law through improved constraints on government powers. In developed countries, policymakers should focus on maintaining and further strengthening institutional transparency, judicial independence, and governance structures to preserve the positive impact of JCGP on the rule of Law. For developing countries, the results suggest that more than simply introducing formal constraints is needed; complementary reforms are required to address institutional weaknesses, political instability, and socio-economic challenges. Policymakers in these contexts should prioritize building institutional capacity, reducing corruption, and promoting governance reforms to ensure that constraints on government powers by the judiciary translate effectively into more robust legal frameworks and justice systems. Tailoring these strategies to the specific governance environments will be essential for sustainable improvements in the rule of Law.

### **Recommendations**

This study has some limitations that offer opportunities for future research:

- First, it focuses on a linear relationship between JCGP and the rule of Law, which may overlook potential non-linear dynamics or lagged effects.
- Second, the analysis is limited to a cross-country perspective without accounting for regional or cultural variations that might influence the results.
- Third, future studies could explore time-varying models or employ non-linear methods to capture more complex relationships. Additionally, expanding the dataset to include other governance indicators or conducting in-depth case studies could provide more nuanced insights into the interplay between the judiciary's constraints on government powers and the rule of Law.

## References

- Act 4 Rule of Law, (n.d.). <http://www.act4ruleoflaw.org/en/news/judiciary>
- A justice report, (2023). A JUSTICE Report, the State We're In: Addressing Threats & Challenges to the Rule of Law. <https://files.justice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/31123029/JUSTICE-The-State-Were-In-Addressing-Threats-Challenges-to-the-Rule-of-Law-September-2023.pdf>
- UniDem, (1994). The Role of the Constitutional Court in Consolidating the Rule of Law. <https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-STD%281994%29010-e>
- Botero, J., C. Ponce, A. (2011). Measuring the Rule of Law, the World Justice Project, November 2010. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1966257> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1966257>
- Guernsey, S., Yu. H. (n.d). What is the Rule of Law? <https://iuristebi.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/what-is-the-rule-of-law.pdf>
- GUERRA, L., L. (2000). The Judiciary and the Separation of Powers. [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-JU\(2000\)021-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-JU(2000)021-e)
- Janse, R., & Corell, H. (2012). Rule of Law: A guide for politicians. [https://research.ou.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/31394834/Rule\\_of\\_Law\\_a\\_guide\\_for\\_politicians.pdf](https://research.ou.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/31394834/Rule_of_Law_a_guide_for_politicians.pdf)
- Lautenbach, Geranne, (2013). The Rule of Law Concept,' The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford, 2013; online edn, Oxford Academic. <https://academic.oup.com/book/6558/chapter-abstract/150499453?redirectedFrom=fulltext>), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199671199.003.0002>,
- Malik AA. (2023). Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in Pakistan. *Asian Journal of Comparative Law*. 18(3):291–302. doi:10.1017/asjcl.2023.28
- Mollah. M., A H. (2022). Judicial Oversight of Bureaucracy. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. [https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-030-66252-3\\_697](https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-030-66252-3_697)
- O'Regan, K. (2005). Checks and Balances Reflections on the Development of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers under the South African Constitution, *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal*, 8(1). <https://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2005/5.html>
- Spanou, C. (2020). Judicial Controls Over the Bureaucracy. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1729>.
- WJP, Rule of Law Index (2023). <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2023.pdf>

- Rosenbluth, F., & Helmke, G. (2009). Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective, *Annual Review of Political Science*. 12:345–66. Doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.121521
- Russell, M., Renwick, A. James, L. (2023). Checks and Balances: What are they, and Why do they Matter? [https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution/unit/sites/constitution unit/files/checks\\_and\\_balances.pdf](https://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution/unit/sites/constitution%20unit/files/checks_and_balances.pdf)
- RABIE, J., A. (1995). Constitutional Checks and Balances. <https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/4457.PDF>
- Street, A. (2013). JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE RULE OF LAW WHO IS IN CONTROL? The Constitution Society, London. [https://www.consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/J1446\\_Constitution\\_Society\\_Judicial\\_Review\\_WEB-22.pdf](https://www.consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/J1446_Constitution_Society_Judicial_Review_WEB-22.pdf)
- Thabo, M., T. & Odeku, K., O. (2021). Separation of powers, checks and balances and judicial exercise of self-restraint: an analysis of case law, *Obiter*, vol. 42 Issue 3, pp. 547- 560.
- UN, (2004). The rule of Law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. Report of the Secretary-General. <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/527647?ln=ar&v=pdf>, from: <https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2023.pdf>
- UN, (2011). Rule of Law Indicator Instruments: A Literature Review, A Report to the Steering Committee of the United Nations Rule of Law Indicators Project. [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un\\_rule\\_of\\_law\\_indicators.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf)
- UNODC, (2018). The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. Retrieved 14 10, 2024, from: <https://www.unodc.org/documents/ji/training/bangaloreprinciples.pdf>
- UN, (1948). [humhttps://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights](https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights)
- UN, (1966). <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments>
- UN, (1985). Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-independence-judiciary>
- UNDP, (n.d). Independence of the Judiciary. <https://www.undp.org/lebanon/projects/independence-judiciary>
- UNDP, (2024). Asia and the Pacific Judicial Integrity. [tps://www.undp.org/asia-pacific/judicial-integrity/news/upholding-integrity-judiciary-maintains-public-trust-and-confidence-legal-system-reinforcing-no-one-above-law](https://www.undp.org/asia-pacific/judicial-integrity/news/upholding-integrity-judiciary-maintains-public-trust-and-confidence-legal-system-reinforcing-no-one-above-law)
- Valcke, A., (2012). The Rule of Law: Its Origins and Meanings (A Short Guide for Practitioners). [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2042336](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2042336)
- Weingast, B., R. (2008). Why Developing Countries Prove So Resistant to the Rule of Law.

[https://jenni.uchicago.edu/WJP/Vienna\\_2008/Weingast\\_ROL\\_MS\\_2%2000\\_08-0519.pdf](https://jenni.uchicago.edu/WJP/Vienna_2008/Weingast_ROL_MS_2%2000_08-0519.pdf)

ZAJC, K. (2014). Independence of Judiciary in Slovenia: Economic and Historical Perspective, *Acta Histriae*, Vol. 22, Issue 3, pp. 741–764.